Summary on “Critique of Violence” by Walter Benjamin
In this essay, Benjamin shows violence’s relation to law and justice. At first, Benjamin mentions violence, as a principle, could be a moral means even to just ends which determined by the criterion for cases of it use. And then, Benjamin explores dimensions on violence from the natural law and positive law. According to the thesis of natural law, “violence is a product of nature” but for the positive law, “violence is a product of history’’ (237). For Benjamin, “natural law attempts, by the justness of the ends, to ‘justify’ the means, positive law ‘guarantee’ the justness of the ends through the justification of the means’’ (237). Secondly, Benjamin mentions ‘‘the different functions of violence rests on whether it serves natural or legal ends which can be traced against a background of specific legal conditions’’ (238). In Benjamin’s own view, “the individual as legal subject is the tendency to deny the natural ends in a given situation, be usefully pursued by violence’’ (238). Benjamin shows violence deals with in the paradoxical way. For Benjamin, “violence can with reason seems so threatening to the law, and be so feared it, must be especially evident on its application’’ (239). And then, Benjamin provides an instance of its application: about the strike by the labor and shows “the objective contradiction in the legal situation”. In Benjamin’s own view, strike cannot be regarded as violence for two reasons, as follows. Firstly, “the organized labor is the only legal subject entitled to exercise violence’’ (239). In the second place, “the right to strike constitutes in the view of labor, which is opposed to that of the state, the right to use force in attaining certain ends’’ (239). Benjamin shows the contradiction on this situation, the right to strike for labor is right but for the state the right is abuse. Thirdly, Benjamin mentions “the police is a institution of the modern state whose violence for legal ends but with the simultaneous authority to decide these ends itself within wide limits’’ (242). For Benjamin, police violence is law-making and “emancipated from both conditions because its function is the assertion of legal claims for any decree’’ (243). Even Benjamin portrays the power of police is formless, like its all pervasive, ghostly presence in the life of civilized states’’ (243). And then, Benjamin refers all violence may be regarded as a means of law-making or law-preserving and violence implies the problematic nature of law itself. What’s more, Benjamin refers mythic violence to show the problematic light on lawmaking violence through explores the legend of Niobe. For Benjamin, “the action of Apollo and Artemis is a punishment and their violence establishes a law far more than it punishes the infringement of a law that already exists’’ (248). And then, Benjamin reveals that “the function of violence in lawmaking is twofolded, in the sense that lawmaking pursues as its end, with violence as the means’’ and “lawmaking establishes a law not an end unalloyed by violence but one necessarily and intimately bound to it under the title of power’’ (248). Finally, Benjamin concludes that “all mythic, lawmaking violence, which we may call ‘executive’, is pernicious’’ (252).
In this essay, Benjamin shows violence’s relation to law and justice. At first, Benjamin mentions violence, as a principle, could be a moral means even to just ends which determined by the criterion for cases of it use. And then, Benjamin explores dimensions on violence from the natural law and positive law. According to the thesis of natural law, “violence is a product of nature” but for the positive law, “violence is a product of history’’ (237). For Benjamin, “natural law attempts, by the justness of the ends, to ‘justify’ the means, positive law ‘guarantee’ the justness of the ends through the justification of the means’’ (237). Secondly, Benjamin mentions ‘‘the different functions of violence rests on whether it serves natural or legal ends which can be traced against a background of specific legal conditions’’ (238). In Benjamin’s own view, “the individual as legal subject is the tendency to deny the natural ends in a given situation, be usefully pursued by violence’’ (238). Benjamin shows violence deals with in the paradoxical way. For Benjamin, “violence can with reason seems so threatening to the law, and be so feared it, must be especially evident on its application’’ (239). And then, Benjamin provides an instance of its application: about the strike by the labor and shows “the objective contradiction in the legal situation”. In Benjamin’s own view, strike cannot be regarded as violence for two reasons, as follows. Firstly, “the organized labor is the only legal subject entitled to exercise violence’’ (239). In the second place, “the right to strike constitutes in the view of labor, which is opposed to that of the state, the right to use force in attaining certain ends’’ (239). Benjamin shows the contradiction on this situation, the right to strike for labor is right but for the state the right is abuse. Thirdly, Benjamin mentions “the police is a institution of the modern state whose violence for legal ends but with the simultaneous authority to decide these ends itself within wide limits’’ (242). For Benjamin, police violence is law-making and “emancipated from both conditions because its function is the assertion of legal claims for any decree’’ (243). Even Benjamin portrays the power of police is formless, like its all pervasive, ghostly presence in the life of civilized states’’ (243). And then, Benjamin refers all violence may be regarded as a means of law-making or law-preserving and violence implies the problematic nature of law itself. What’s more, Benjamin refers mythic violence to show the problematic light on lawmaking violence through explores the legend of Niobe. For Benjamin, “the action of Apollo and Artemis is a punishment and their violence establishes a law far more than it punishes the infringement of a law that already exists’’ (248). And then, Benjamin reveals that “the function of violence in lawmaking is twofolded, in the sense that lawmaking pursues as its end, with violence as the means’’ and “lawmaking establishes a law not an end unalloyed by violence but one necessarily and intimately bound to it under the title of power’’ (248). Finally, Benjamin concludes that “all mythic, lawmaking violence, which we may call ‘executive’, is pernicious’’ (252).
全站熱搜
留言列表
{{ article.title }}